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Abstract—The myIdP service is an extension to the Swiss eID
infrastructure with the aim to provide a service that handles
personal attributes (like address, telephone number, email), which
are neither part of the SuisseID identity providers nor of a Claim
Assertion Service (CAS), because there is no official authority
owning and certifying these data. The myIdP service is a CAS that
can reuse data which a user has already given to an application
via an Internet transaction. The data is thus validated by the
web application before being transferred - as Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 attribute assertion - to the myIdP
service. The myIdP service comes in two flavors with different
trust relations: the attribute provider and the claim proxy. The
attribute provider unites several claims for a given attribute and
provides an optional quality assessment before sending it to a
requesting web application. A trust relationship must consist
between myIdP and the web application. The claim proxy only
collects the received claims for a given attribute and transfers
them with all details to the requesting application. The application
can evaluate the confidence in the data based on the claim details.
The model to assess the quality and trustworthiness of the data is
based mainly on three factors: freshness of information, quality
of the attribute issuer and recurrence of information. The myIdP
service is evaluated in a scenario of prefilling e-forms in an
eGovernment application.
Keywords-electronic identity, SuisseID, attribute authority, e-
form, quality assessment.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a previous paper [1], we presented myIdP, a service based
on the SuisseID Infrastructure, an infrastructure for electronic
proof of identities (eID) in Switzerland introduced in 2012. In
this extended version of the paper we describe the prototype
in more detail and discuss the quality model for claims.
The basis of the SuisseID Infrastructure is the SuisseID [2],
which is available as USB stick or chip card and contains
two digital certificates: (1) the SuisseID identification and
authentication certificate (IAC) and (2) the SuisseID qualified
digital certificate (QC). The SuisseID IAC can be used to
identify the owner in Internet transactions. The SuisseID
QC can be used to sign electronic documents in a forgery-
proof manner and is not used in the context of myIdP. The
SuisseIDs are issued by identity providers (IdP). Contrary
to other European countries, where electronic identities are
issued by the government together with offline identification
(ID card), there are one governmental, but two commercial
SuisseID IdPs [3][4] at present.
The SuisseID and its certificates contain only a minimum
of personal data (SuisseID number, name or pseudonym and
optional email address), due to stringent privacy and data
protection requirements in Switzerland. Additionally, a subset
of the personal data from the identification document (e.g.,
a passport) and a well-defined set of additional attributes
gathered during the registration process (so called registration
process data, RPD) are stored in the identity provider service
(extended IdP). The only way to retrieve this data is by strong
authentication with the IdP service, using the appropriate
SuisseID IAC. The SuisseID Infrastructure is completed with
a set of Claim Assertion Services (CAS) [5]. The purpose of a
CAS is to provide and certify specific properties or attributes,
which had been assigned to the SuisseID owner by some
private or public authority. Examples are the membership of
an organization or a company, and the proof of professional
qualifications, like a notary or a doctor. Especially in the
context of eGovernment there is a need for an extension of
the beforehand described SuisseID Infrastructure.
More personal attributes (like invoice address, telephone
number, email) used in web applications, e.g., online shops, or
in electronic forms often used in the eGovernment, are neither
subject of the SuisseID IdPs nor the CAS, because there is no
official authority owning and certifying these data. The myIdP
service fills that gap and allows a SuisseID owner to store and
maintain personal attributes. The idea is to store information,
which was at least entered (and thus used) once in a web
application, for later reuse. The data is used and thus validated
by the web application before being transferred as Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) attribute statement [6]
(the so-called attribute claim) to the myIdP service. After that,
the user can reuse the attribute for other applications, which
improves usability and reduces the error potential in the daily
internet transactions.
This paper starts with the related work in Section II, then
outlines the architecture, components and flavors of myIdP in
Section III. Privacy and data security are subjects of Section
IV. In Section V, the integration of myIdP in a scenario of
prefilling e-forms is shown. The myIdP quality assessment
and trustworthiness is discussed in Section VI. Section VII
concludes the document and gives an outlook on further
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improvements of myIdP.
II. RELATED WORK
A service like myIdP or a SuisseID CAS technically cor-
responds to an Attribute Authority defined by SAML [6]: An
Attribute Authority is a system entity that produces attribute
assertions [7].
In general, most of the known SAML Identity Providers
(IdPs) can act as an Attribute Authority and issue attribute
assertions beside their usual authentication functionality. Ex-
amples are the government-issued electronic identities of the
European Countries, like the German Identity Card [8], the
beID from Belgium [9] or the Citizens Card from Austria [10].
Similar to the SuisseID, all these government-issued eIDs
provide only a small number of personal attributes related to
the identity document they belong to.
The national electronic identities of the European member
states are made interoperable with the STORK European eID
Interoperability Platform [11]. With six pilots, the STORK
project offers several cross-border eGovernment identity ser-
vices. In the follow-up project STORK 2.0 [12] also personal
attributes related to eIDs are subject of investigation. E.g.,
in the banking pilot, public and private identity and attribute
providers are included in the process of ”Opening a bank
account” in a foreign country, online, with a national eID,
without physical presence. myIdP could be used in this con-
text as attribute provider for personal attributes, like address,
telephone number, email, etc.
In contrast to the central, government-regulated eID ser-
vices, OpenID [13] is a decentralized authentification ser-
vice for web based services. The user is free to choose
his favourite OpenID identity provider to get an OpenID,
which is an URL or XRI including an end-user chosen name
(e.g., alice.openid.example.org). OpenID providers are, e.g.,
Clavid [14], CloudID [15], Google [16] etc. The OpenID
providers themselves can support different authentification
methods. For example, Clavid offers username/password, one
time passwords, SuisseID authentication and the biometric
AXSionics Internet Passport.
User attributes, like name, gender or favorite movies, can
also be transferred from the OpenID identity providers to
the relying party following the OpenID Attribute Exchange
Specification [17]. The attributes can be defined (almost)
freely, according to the requirements of the relying party.
As many OpenID providers do not validate the information
entered by the users, the provided attributes have a low level
of assurance. There is a need for a validation by a trusted 3rd
party, a so called attribute provider (AP). Google started the
Open Attribute Exchange Network (Open AXN, also known
as ”street identity”, see [18]) to include validated information
from APs. myIdP has the potential to act as an OpenID
attribute provider, but is currently only enabled to be used
together with the SuisseID.
WebIDs [19] are especially common in social media (Face-
book, LinkedIn, etc.) to allow users to identify themselves in
order to publish information. Each user can make their own
WebID or rely on an identity provider. The WebID is a URL
Figure 1. myIdP components and service provider roles
with a #tag pointing to a FOAF file [20] that contains a cross-
link to a (self-generated) certificate. Information that should
be included but is not required in a WebID Profile are the
name (foaf:name) of the individual or agent, the email address
associated (foaf:mbox) and the agent’s image (foaf:depiction).
More attributes and links to all kind of web objects (other
persons, groups, publications, account, etc.) can be included
as well. WebIDs can be connected to OpenIDs and vice versa.
III. ARCHITECTURE
myIdP consists of four components (see orange boxes in
Figure 1): the myIdP Service, the myIdP WebApp, the myIdP
Admin and the myIdP API.
A. myIdP Service
The myIdP Service is an attribute authority according to the
SAML 2.0 standard [6] distributing assertions in response to
identity attribute queries from an entity acting as an attribute
requester. Like a typical SuisseID CAS [5], the users can –
after a successful authentication with their SuisseID IAC –
select and confirm attributes, which were formerly received
from an attribute issuer, e.g., a web shop, and are stored in the
myIdP database. The available attributes are not fixed. They
depend on the application scenario and can be configured with
the help of the myIdP Admin tool.
New to the concept of CAS is the provisioning of a quality
(level of assurance, level of confidence) together within the
attribute assertions. myIdP integrates a quality module that
calculates the trustworthiness of the provided information on
the basis of the age, number of affirmations and quality of
the issuer of the received and stored attribute assertions. This
assurance level or quality can be used by an attribute requester
to insist on a certain level of assurance for the requested
attributes. The different approaches to calculate the assurance
level or quality are discussed in Section VI.
The myIdP Service is available in two flavors: the Attribute
Provider and the Claim Proxy.
The Attribute Provider summarizes the attribute assertions
available in the myIdP database for the given request. All
details about the original attribute providers of the information
are hidden. After the user has selected and confirmed the
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attribute values, the newly built attribute assertion is signed
by the myIdP Service. When requested, an assurance level is
included in this assertion. For this myIdP flavor, a direct trust
relationship is established between the myIdP Service and the
web application in the attribute requester role.
Figure 2. Example Processing Attribute Request
In Figure 2, an example of the process of constructing a
response for an attribute request is shown. The attribute email
is requested. In the myIdP database, four records with two
different values are found. The two values are displayed to
the user, who selects and confirms which one to use. The
SAML attribute response then contains this value with myIdP
as attribute issuer.
This is different in the second myIdP flavor. The Claim
Proxy extracts the stored attribute assertions from the myIdP
database for a given attribute request. After the selection of
attribute values and the explicit confirmation by the user,
an attribute assertion containing an URI and optionally the
assurance level is returned to the requesting web application
(the differences between the Attribute Provider and Proxy
Mode are highlighted in red in Figure 2). This attribute request
is also signed by myIdP but only to ensure integrity. The web
application can use the URI from the attribute assertion to
assess the originally received attribute assertions enveloped in
an XML document. After downloading the XML document,
the web application can access all details of the original
assertions, including the issuers and timestamps, and perform
its own quality assessment. The trust relationship has changed:
the web application trusts the attribute issuers directly.
In order to support the provision of a quality assessment
of an attribute value and of the claim list URI, the SAML
attribute assertions was extended (see the XSD fragment shown
in Figure 3).
The SAML attribute request contains an additional flag
(attribute ClaimList), that indicates the use of claim proxy
mode. The SAML attribute response contains as result an
URI pointing to a list of claims (attribute assertions) extracted
from the myIdP database (attribute ClaimListURI). See the
shortened example of a SAML attribute response in Figure
4. The URI is only for a short time available to the service
provider and enables the service provider to download all claim
details.
An example for the provided claimlists is shown conception-
ally in Figure 5. Corresponding to the example used in Figure
<complexType name="AttributeType">
<sequence>
<element ref="saml:AttributeValue"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="Name" type="string"
use="required" />
<attribute name="NameFormat" type="anyURI"
use="optional" />
<attribute name="FriendlyName" type="string"
use="optional" />
<attribute name="myidp:Quality" type="decimal"
use="optional" />
<attribute name="myidp:ClaimListURI" type="anyURI"
use="optional" />
<attribute name="myidp:ClaimList" type="boolean"
use="optional" />
<anyAttribute namespace="##other"
processContents="lax" />
</complexType>
Figure 3. Extended xsd AttributeType
<saml2p:Response>
<saml2:Issuer>https://myidp.bfh.ch:8443
</saml2:Issuer>
<ds:Signature> ... </ds:Signature>
<saml2p:Status>
<saml2p:StatusCode Value=
"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
</saml2p:Status>
<saml2:Assertion>
<saml2:Issuer>https://myidp.bfh.ch:8443
</saml2:Issuer>
<ds:Signature> ... </ds:Signature>
<saml2:Subject>
<saml2:NameID>1300-0000-0001-0001</saml2:NameID>
...
</saml2:Subject>
<saml2:Conditions
NotBefore="2014-01-17T13:12:23.922Z"
NotOnOrAfter="2014-01-17T13:22:25.922Z"/>
<saml2:AttributeStatement>
<saml2:Attribute
Name="http://www.ech.ch/xmlns/
eCH-0046/2/emailAddress"
NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:
attrname-format:uri"
myidp:issuerlisturi="https://myidp.bfh.ch:8443/
myidp-service/requestXml?param=397332808"
xmlns:myidp=
"http://www.myidp.ch/xmlns/schema/v1">
<saml2:AttributeValue>a.b@bfh.ch
</saml2:AttributeValue>
</saml2:Attribute>
</saml2:AttributeStatement>
</saml2:Assertion>
</saml2p:Response>
Figure 4. SAML Attribute response
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2, the claim list contains three entries. The service provider
can use the information to do its own quality assessment.
Figure 5. Example Claim Proxy - Claim List
B. myIdP WebApp
The myIdP WebApp is the end user front-end of myIdP,
where users – after the successful authentication with their
SuisseID IAC – can view and manage their attributes. At-
tributes cannot be entered directly into the myIdP WebApp,
except the master data related to the myIdP account (billing
address and contact email). Attributes always come from a
service provider, e.g., a web application, acting as attribute
issuer, which forwards – after confirmation by the user – the
attribute assertions to myIdP. The attributes then arrive in the
so-called Inbox (see Figure 7), where they can be viewed in
detail and manually activated before they are exposed via the
myIdP service. Corresponding to the user-centric approach of
the SuisseID, the users are always in control of their data and
can activate/deactivate and delete attributes at any time. As a
side effect, the user gets a usage history of their attributes in
the web.
C. myIdP Admin
The myIdP Admin is an administration tool for myIdP.
It supports the maintenance of attribute definitions and the
registration process of service providers, which is needed to
set up secure connections and trust relationships. A service
provider can register as attribute issuer or attribute requester
(see Section III-E). The registration details contain the used
URLs, certificates and optional SAML metadata.
The registration also allows myIdP to ensure that the service
providers well behave. Otherwise one might for instance issue
non-consented claims.
New attributes can be enabled for usage within the myIdP
community simply by importing the related XML Schemata
or by using the SAML Metadata Exchange [21].
In order to assist the research activities to develop an
appropriate quality model, the myIdP Admin supports the
substitution of the used quality model. Due to the use of the
Strategy design pattern, it is possible to develop and integrate
new quality calculation models at any time.
D. myIdP API
The myIdP API provides an interface to the central database
commonly used by the other three myIdP components.
E. Service Providers
A service provider can interact with myIdP, incorporating
two roles (see the blue boxes in Figure 1):
• Attribute Requester: The service provider electroni-
cally sends an attribute query to the myIdP Service in
order to draw a confirmation statement - a SAML 2.0
attribute assertion - from the myIdP service and uses it
in further actions, e.g., prefilling of web forms.
• Attribute Issuer: The service provider sends SAML
2.0 attribute statements (unsolicited SAML response) to
myIdP. (Despite the possibility to group several attributes
in one SAML statement, myIdP prefers single attribute
statements, in order to expose a minimum of information
in the claim proxy case.) The attribute values were
entered either manually into the web application by the
users or have been requested beforehand from the myIdP
Service.
A special attribute issuer is the myIdP WebApp, which
uses the master data (address, email) entered during the
myIdP registration process, to provide the first attribute
statements to the users.
Figure 6. Screenshot myIdP Client - Attribute Issuer
To demonstrate and test the behaviour of a service provider,
a demo web application, the myIdP Client, was developed.
The myIdP Client offers two functionalities, corresponding to
the two service provider roles: sending attributes to the myIdP
Service and requesting attributes.
In Figure 6, the screen for acting as an attribute issuer is
shown. The user can, like in a normal web application, enter
some data, e.g., an address or the email. When the user hits
the button ”next” and has checked the box beside, to confirm
the disclosure of his data to myIdP, the myIdP client sends
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Figure 7. Screenshot myIdP WebApp - Inbox
Figure 8. Screenshot myIdP Client - Attribute Requester
an unsolicited SAML response message to the myIdP Service.
The myIdP service validates the message and if valid, stores
it in the myIdP database. The user can now enter the myIdP
WebApp to activate this attribute for further use.
Figure 8 shows the second role a service provider can
incorporate. Before prompting the user for input, the service
provider sends a request of a set of SAML attribute to
the myIdP service. The user can now select and confirm
the different values, instead of reentering them in the web
application. In the myIdP client the normally hidden step is
visualized. The user can select which attribute to request from
myIdP. Additionally, a quality assurance value or the claim list
activating the Claim Proxy mode of myIdP (see myIdP flavors
in Section III-A) can be requested.
IV. PRIVACY
One important characteristic of myIdP (valid for both fla-
vors) is the user-centric approach. The user is always aware
which information is exchanged and has to confirm explicitly
every single attribute that is sent out by myIdP.
myIdP implements multiple measures to ensure the privacy
of the user:
First, every attribute issuer has to get a user consent before
sending any attribute statement to myIdP. In the myIdP client,
this is realized by actively requesting the user to check the
check-box, that allows the application to send the information
to myIdP (see Figure 6). Another option is to include the user
consent prominent in the Terms of Usage of the application.
That the attribute issuers full fill these requirements is
ensured by myIdP with a registration process for attribute
issuers and a corresponding white list.
Secondly, in myIdP the incoming attributes are deactivated
by default. The user has to confirm explicitly whether the
attributes should be activated (for further use). At any time
the user is free to delete attribute statements in the myIdP
WebApp or to deactivate them.
Thirdly, the user is involved in every message exchange
with an Attribute Requester and has to confirm all attribute
values. In the claim proxy case, the disclosure of original
attribute assertions needs to be approved as well. The attribute
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Figure 9. Sequence diagram ”Get e-form”
assertions contain information about visited web sites and
could be used to track the user and to create user profiles.
In any case, myIdP only sends attribute statements to
Attribute Requesters if a valid authentication with a SuisseID
in addition to the user consent exists. These procedures ensure
that the user exposes only the intended data and the privacy is
protected.
V. APPLICATION SCENARIO
A scenario of completing electronic forms (e-forms) vali-
dates our approach. E-forms are commonly used in the Swiss
eGovernment. With the help of the SuisseID, the citizen can
be identified securely and the attributes stored in the core
SuisseID components, like name, birthday, place of birth or
nationality, can be used to prefill the e-forms. As the number
of attributes available in the core SuisseID is quite limited, we
propose the usage of myIdP to provide additional values for
the e-forms.
For our proof of concept, we chose the form ”Proof of
residence”, which had an integration with the core SuisseID
infrastructure already. In Figure 11, an extract of the French
version of this form is displayed. The data filled from the
core SuisseID infrastructure and myIdP are marked differently
(pink - core SuisseID, yellow - myIdP). The data from the
SuisseID cannot be overwritten by the user, as they represent
certified attributes validated by a trusted authority. In contrast,
the myIdP data can be updated. When all data is up-to-date,
the user only has to enter one number, which is the number of
copies wished-for (the field is marked with a red box), before
sending the e-form to the administration.
In Figure 9, the interactions between the user, the e-form
provider, the core SuisseID components and myIdP are de-
picted (only the main scenario is depicted, exceptions and error
cases are omitted for the sake of readability):
1) Service Request: the user requests an e-form from the
e-form provider (e.g., by clicking on a link).
Figure 10. Sequence diagram ”Save e-form”
2) Authentication with SuisseID: the e-form provider is-
sues a combined authentication and attribute request
to the SuisseID IdP/CAS. The following attributes are
requested: name, first name and birthday.
3) Confirmation request: the user has to identify themself,
by entering his secret key (PIN) and in a second step
to confirm the SuisseID attributes.
4) Confirmation response: the user’s decisions are sent
back to the SuisseID IdP/CAS.
5) Authentication and Attribute response: the SuisseID
IdP/CAS sends a combined authentication and attribute
assertion back to the e-form provider.
6) myIdP attribute request: the e-form provider issues an
attribute request to the myIdP service asking for the
address and the email.
7) Authentication Request: the myIdP data are only acces-
sible to the identified owners. That means, the myIdP
Service forces a (second) SuisseID authentication.
8) Confirmation request: the user has to identify themself,
by entering the secret key (PIN) and in a second step
to confirm the disclosure of his identity.
9) Confirmation response: the user’s decisions are sent
back to the SuisseID IdP.
10) Authentication response: the SuisseID IdP sends an
authentication assertion back to the myIdP Service.
11) Confirmation request: the user has to select the attribute
values, in case several emails or addresses are stored in
myIdP, and to confirm the selection.
12) Confirmation response: the user’s decisions are sent
back to myIdP.
13) Attribute response: myIdP sends an attribute assertion
back to the e-form provider.
14) Service: the e-form is displayed to the user and contains
the selected and confirmed values from the SuisseID
IdP/CAS and myIdP.
The user now has to complete the e-form and to enter the
number of copies desired. In case, the email or home address
has changed, the data can be also manually corrected on the
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Figure 11. Prefilled e-form ”Proof of residence”
e-form (the data from the SuisseID IdP/CAS are read-only
and cannot be changed). When the document is saved the
governmental process of providing the requested documents is
started. However, the confirmed data from the e-form are also
transferred – as new attribute assertions (unsolicited message)
containing validated information – to myIdP (see Figure 10)
where it is stored in the myIdP database.
Looking closely at the interactions between the different
actors involved in the application scenario (see Figure 9), it
becomes obvious that the user has to authenticate themself
twice with the SuisseID IdP: the first time to access the data
from the SuisseID CAS and the second time to access the
data from the myIdP service. This is quite inconvenient for
the user and hardly acceptable in an eGovernment scenario. A
possible solution is to enhance the myIdP Service further to
support the proxying of authentication requests to a subsequent
identity provider, as described in [22]. With this functionality,
the user would be requested to authenticate only once; but the
two attribute confirmation requests would still be necessary.
A crucial point of using myIdP in eGovernment applications
and also in other domains is the selection and standardization
of attributes. In our scenario, we could reuse attributes defined
and published as Swiss standards, e.g., the eCH-0010 [23]
for the address and eCH-0042 [24] for the email. Relying on
these standards, the service provider (in our use case, the e-
forms provider) can define a stable mapping between the field
names in the e-forms or the web application and the attributes
supported by the myIdP Service.
VI. QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND TRUSTWORTHINESS
As already mentioned in Section III-A, the myIdP Service
is enabled to offer a quality assessment for the provided
attributes. This is important, because myIdP does not provide
certified information about the SuisseID owner, like a normal
CAS. The source of a normal CAS is typically a register
belonging to a public or private authority. Examples are the
Health Professional Index or the Notary Index of Switzerland,
available in [25].
myIdP provides personal information typically without an
official authority, which could validate and certify this data. To
ensure a good data quality and to increase the trustworthiness
of the myIdP data, the user is not allowed to enter the data
directly in myIdP. Only a registered attribute issuer can send
assertions to myIdP. This ensures, that all information available
in myIdP is validated at least once by a service provider acting
as attribute issuer.
A service provider acting as attribute requester needs to
know how reliable the myIdP data are. In a closed myIdP
community, where all service providers incorporate both roles
(attribute requester as well as attribute issuer) and have built
up trust relationships, the myIdP data would be evenly trust-
worthy. In a more open environment, where many service
providers interact with myIdP, this is different. The service
providers need a reliable mean to ensure the trustworthiness
of the myIdP information.
The myIdP offers a quality assessment based on an open
model. When a service provider acts as an attribute requester,
it can ask for the optional quality assessment by myIdP (a
value between 0 and 1), provided together with the requested
attributes. It can even insist of a certain quality and include
a minimum quality the attribute must fulfill in the attribute
request (visible in the screenshot in Figure 8). In this case,
myIdP will only select attribute values which match or exceed
the requested quality.
If a service provider is not willing to rely on the quality
assessment of myIdP, he can choose the myIdP Proxy mode
(see Section III-A). In this myIdP flavor, the attribute requester
gets all stored attribute assertions from the myIdP database
belonging to the return attribute value. They can now perform
their own quality assessment.
The quality assessment is a statement about the potential
correctness of an attribute value. We identified three factors
the quality assessment in myIdP should be based on:
1) Freshness of information
2) Quality of attribute issuer
3) Recurrence of information
A. Freshness of information
The freshness f can be calculated from the age a of an
attribute assertion. This is the time between when the attribute
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assertion was issued and the time when a service provider
requests this information. The fresher the attribute assertion,
the better the quality. The quality of an attribute decreases
gradually. In [26], the Formula (1) was elaborated and tested. It
calculates the freshness on the basis of a normalized age value
(like the quality a value between 0 and 1). The normalization
has to be determined in dependency of the attribute. The
average validity of attributes can be quite different; some, like
eye color or gender, do almost not change during lifetime,
others, like address, do in certain periods. To determine this
average validity, demographic information could be used.
f = 0.5 +
√
1− 2a2 ∗ 0.5 if (0 ≤ a ≤ 0.5)
f = 0.5−√1− 4 ∗ (a− 1)2 ∗ 0.5 if (0.5 < a ≤ 1)
(1)
B. Quality of attribute issuer
We propose to classify the attribute issuers according the the
STORK Attribute Quality Authentication Assurance (AQAA)
scheme [27], which is an extension of the STORK Quality
Authentication Assurance (QAA) scheme published in [28].
The STORK QAA model permits quality levels to be assigned
to various eID solutions, based on some of their main char-
acteristics. The STORK AQAA model extends this model to
be applied to attribute providers providing no directly related
information to an eID solution.
The myIdP attribute issuers can be considered as attribute
providers and therefore be classified into the four STORK
QAA Levels (see Table I).
TABLE I. STORK QAA LEVELS [28]
STORK QAA level Description
1 No or minimal assurance
2 Low assurance
3 Substantial assurance
4 High assurance
The AQAA level of the attribute issuers influences the
quality of an attribute, like shown in Figure 12. In combination
with the freshness of attribute (see Formula (1)), a low level
of AQAA results in a displacement of the curve and therefor
in a general decrease of quality.
The quality q of a single assertion can be calculated using
the Formula (2), whereby coefficient kAQAA indicates the
decrease of quality assigned to the reached AQAA level of
the attribute issuer.
q = max{f − kAQAA, 0} (2)
C. Recurrence
An increasing number n of assertions containing the same
value for an attribute should increase the quality of this value.
We propose a formula (3) that shows a logarithmic behavior
to calculate the recurrence rset of a set of assertions. The
rise coefficient krise is responsible to determine how steep the
increase of quality should be at the beginning; it is normally
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Figure 12. Freshness combined with AQAA level of attribute issuers
a value between 1 and 10. Like the influence of the age of the
freshness, the rise coefficient can be different for each attribute.
rset = min{(log(n)+krise)/(krise+1)∗0.5, 1} if (0 ≤ n)
(3)
D. Assertion sets
The quality of an assertion set can be calculated using
different formulas. The simplest case would be to take only
into account the recurrence and use Formula (3).
In Formula (4), the best freshness value is combined with
size of the set (recurrence). The AQAA level of attribute
issuers is not taken into account.
qset = min{max
i
{fi}+ rset, 1} (4)
Formula (5) is quite similar to Formula (4), but it uses the
freshness in combination with the AQAA level.
qset = min{max
i
{qi}+ rset, 1} (5)
Both formulas tend to overrate the recurrence of the infor-
mation and are prone to fraud scenarios, where many assertions
from a low ranked attribute provider can significantly increase
the quality.
qset = min{max
i
{qi}+ rset, αMaxAQAA+1} (6)
The third formula (6) reduces this risk of fraud by limiting
the quality of the set of assertions to the maximum value
allowed by the next highest AQAA level (αMaxAQAA+1). That
means, when the set contains hundreds of assertions from a
low-level attribute provider, the quality cannot reach a better
value than the highest possible quality of an assertion from an
attribute provider on the next higher level.
All three formulas were validated in several scenarios. Still,
an assessment of a live-running scenario in a set-up myIdP
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community is lacking. On the basis on real-world data, also
other approaches to calculate the quality assessment, e.g.,
based on subjective logic or Bayesian networks would be
possible.
VII. CONCLUSION
myIdP is an extension to the SuisseID infrastructure. It pro-
poses a Claim Assertion Service (SAML attribute authority),
which handles personal data used and validated beforehand
in other internet transactions. The concept is extensible to
other eID solutions and can also be integrated in the STORK
European eID Interoperability Platform. In a next step, the
possibility to use myIdP as OpenID attribute provider will
be investigated. Also the combination with a WebID seems
feasible.
The myIdP concept was validated with a prototypical im-
plementation following the proposed architecture. The initial
implementation on the basis of the SuisseID SDK [29] quickly
showed some limitations. Especially the use of an flexible
attribute set or structured attributes, like address, were only
partly supported. This was also due to the SuisseID SDK,
which was designed for a fixed attribute set. These limitations
were addressed in a subsequent bachelor thesis [30]
As proof of concept, the prototype was integrated in an
eGovernment scenario of prefilling an e-form in order to
obtain a proof of residence. The integration of more e-forms
is planned. As precondition the set of myIdP attributes has to
be extended to have a standardized basis for the information
exchange.
The promoting of the myIdP service showed that many
applications are willing to act as Attribute Requester and to use
the personal attributes available in myIdP. The functionality to
act as Claim Provider and to provide validated information
to myIdP and to confirm the reuse is often seen as burden.
However, both roles equally have to be provided to create a
network of validated personal attributes.
As soon as more service providers will use myIdP in a life
scenario and provide regularly attribute claims, the model to
calculate the assurance level (quality) can be validated on a
real data basis and be improved further.
To strengthen the user-centric approach even more and to
protect the private attribute, the central storage of claims in
the myIdP database could be changed towards a pseudo-local
approach that lets the user choose where to store the data:
on a personal device or on a central place. The storage of
SAML assertions on the user’s device would also enable the
usage of myIdP - in addition to the normal online scenario -
in environments with limited or no connectivity.
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